Crime as an assemblage by Crockett Thomas, Phil
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology   Crime as an assemblage 
July/August 2020, 12:68-79                                                                                                               Crockett Thomas  
68 
 
 
 
 
 
Journal of 
  Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology  
 
ISSN: 2166-8094           Jtpcrim July/August 2020: 12:68-79 
 
 
_____________________________________ 
Crime as an assemblage 
Phil Crockett Thomas, University of Glasgow 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This article seeks to make an original contribution to criminology and the sociology of crime 
and punishment by elaborating the ‘assemblage’, a concept which originates in the collaborative 
poststructuralist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and discussing its ontological 
implications for researching crime. I will first introduce the concept and its application. I then 
discuss the relationship between the assemblage and Michel Foucault’s concept of the dispositif. 
I demonstrate how the assemblage could be used to analyse crime events and discuss questions 
of change and scale within the assemblage. I conclude by outlining some implications for how 
adopting this concept would change the way we practice and research crime and punishment. 
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Introduction 
This article seeks to make an original contribution to criminology and the sociology of crime and 
punishment by elaborating the ‘assemblage’ concept which originates in the collaborative 
poststructuralist philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari and discussing its ontological 
implications for researching crime. I will do this through a close reading of the concept as it appears 
in their co-authored work, primarily in A Thousand Plateaus (1980, first translated into English in 
1987).i I will first introduce the concept and its etymology. I then discuss the relationship between 
the assemblage and Michel Foucault’s concept of the dispositif. I demonstrate how the 
assemblage could be used to analyse crime and discuss coherence and change within the 
assemblage. I conclude by suggesting some implications for how adopting this concept would 
change the way we practice and research crime and punishment. 
As a model of multiplicity, the assemblage has been taken up and variously adapted and 
developed in the work of numerous scholars within the humanities and social sciences (for 
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example Bennett, 2009; DeLanda, 2006; Latour, 2005; Puar, 2007; Sassen, 2008). ‘Assemblage’ 
has also become something of a general term within academic discourse in recent years, used, for 
example, to indicate something’s complexity, its determinative irreducibility, or as shorthand for a 
complex system (for example: Gray, 2013; Maglione, 2018). Whilst these descriptive uses can be 
productive, in this article I follow some recent scholarship (Buchanan, 2015, 2017; Nail, 2017) in 
emphasising the assemblage as an analytic tool – useful for defamiliarising and problematising 
things that seem stable, coherent and understood, by drawing attention to the way that things are 
included or excluded by the concept in its constitution as such. In the way that I am using it, the 
assemblage is a political concept. In the employment of the assemblage for analysis, it is not 
adequate to describe the content of the assemblage; we have to look at what it affects in its 
arrangement. So, if we were to think of a crime as an assemblage, we would have to ask: what is 
this configuration of crime in aid of, what are its limits, and what effects does it produce? Within 
criminology and the sociology of crime, the assemblage is currently most widely used by theorists 
of surveillance (for example: Brown, 2006; Bogard, 2006; Mantello, 2016). Haggerty and Ericson’s 
conceptualisation of the networked ‘surveillant assemblage’ (Haggerty & Ericson, 2000), which 
incorporates Deleuze’s late ‘Postscript on the Societies of Control’ (1992) is particularly influential 
here. However, in comparison with the humanities and other social sciences, the ontological 
implications of Deleuze and Guattari’s work have been scarcely explored within criminology.ii 
Notable exceptions are found within the work of Dragan Milovanovic and Bruce Arrigo (Milovanovic, 
1997; Milovanovic et al., 2005; Arrigo & Milovanovic, 2009), the collection New Directions for 
Criminology (2010), edited by Ronnie Lippens and Patrick van Calster, Don Crew’s Becoming 
Criminal (2013), and Elaine Campbell’s recent work (2016, 2019). Lippens and van Calster (2010, 
p. 10) stress the need ‘to translate or at least direct the most important tenets of poststructuralist 
thought towards [Cohen’s] three basic questions’, these being (after Edwin Sutherland (1947)): 
‘why are laws made? Why are they broken? What do we do or what should we do about this?’ 
(Cohen, 1988, p. 9). Although such engagements are productive, it is important to note that I do 
not share this orientation towards making poststructuralist thought ‘work’ within the familiar 
territory assembled through criminology. Instead, I share Jamie Murray’s contention that a sincere 
‘cross over of Deleuze & Guattari and criminology would presage not only deviating concepts of 
crime, but also deviating ethical and political becomings’ (Murray, 2010, p. 77). In other words, 
rigorous engagement with Deleuze and Guattari’s thought entails accepting an ontological premise 
which (in their spatial terminology) ‘deterritorializes’ much of criminology’s familiar terrain and 
entails a ‘reterritorialization’: a new practice of criminology in which commonplaces like ‘crime’, 
‘harm’ and ‘deviance’ are understood as produced through interactions with other social 
assemblages and processes.  
 
 
The assemblage 
In his earlier work Deleuze was engaged in an ambitious project that targeted what he termed the 
central ‘illusion’ of philosophy: that there is a transcendent principle or set of principles outside of 
our practices and discourses that can be invoked authoritatively and innocently to give order, value 
and meaning to the world. He argued that the dominant mode within European thought prioritised 
the representation and recognition of fixed identities, essences, origins and truths. Against this, 
drawing on a lineage of thinkers including Baruch Spinoza and Henri Bergson, he attempted to 
conceptualise life in the flux of ‘becoming’, rather than defining and fixing static forms of ‘being’. 
Thinking with ‘becoming’ privileges experimentation and movement over placing things into a pre-
existing schema. For works that develop this critique and a new ‘image of thought’ see in particular 
his Difference and Repetition (2004a) originally published in French in 1968, and The Logic of 
Sense (2004b) first published in 1969. In his collaborations with Guattari, Deleuze’s processual 
ontology of ‘becoming’ rather than fixed ‘being’ was given a socio-political reformulation through 
Guattari’s politicised practice of psychoanalysis. For example, the interpretive confusion in the 
wake of the events of May ’68 led them to argue for political analysis which also attends to the 
‘micropolitics’ of an event, rather than assuming that change can be fully analysed according to 
the actions of pre-established political groupings such as classes, factions, and political parties 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 238).  
Journal of Theoretical & Philosophical Criminology   Crime as an assemblage 
July/August 2020, 12:68-79                                                                                                               Crockett Thomas  
70 
 
             The assemblage is an important concept within Deleuze and Guattari’s theoretical 
framework, with versions of it appearing across their joint-authored works (Deleuze & Guattari, 
1994, 2004a, 2004b, 2012).iii Deleuze and Guattari claim that things usually categorised as 
discrete subjects or objects, for example humans, artworks, crimes, and institutions, can be 
conceptualised as assemblages: reasonably mobile configurations of acts, affects, emotions, 
utterances, things, practices and concepts that produce effects based on their shifting 
configurations and connections (Deleuze & Guattari, 1994, 2004a, 2004b, 2012). Importantly, 
assemblages do not just exist on the level of discourse: Deleuze and Guattari describe 
assemblages as comprising both ‘content’ and ‘expressions’ which are mutually presupposed and 
co-constituted (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 200–201). The elements which constitute an 
assemblage are made to congregate via repeated couplings; assemblages are machinic and 
inventive in their operations, producing the connections and disconnections with other 
assemblages which maintain their existence as such (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 448–449). 
Assemblages are constituted by their relationships with other assemblages. This is not a closed or 
static model; rather its structure is always open, and provisional – although there are reoccurring 
features to which it is important to attend. Although assemblages are mobile and capable of 
change, they tend towards stability and stratification (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 4, 45). 
Assemblages are not static hierarchies of relations, but neither are they random in their 
configuration. It is important to be aware of the impact of a connection with a more immobile or 
enduring assemblage which has the power to affect and re-shape emergent assemblages. For 
example, we should critically consider how the existing prison assemblage weighs on any emerging 
alternatives and bends them back into line with its own character. As such, the way an assemblage 
is configured is not inevitable but ‘always concerned about questions of power’ (Buchanan, 2015, 
p. 382). They are ‘purposeful’ (Buchanan, 2015, p. 385) but not in the sense of comprising a 
homogenous intentionality that could be seen as evidencing simple causality or design. It is more 
a question of thinking about the assemblage as a machineiv for doing something, or that has a 
tendency to produce certain effects.  
             Etymologically, it should be noted that the English word ‘assemblage’ is an approximate 
translation of the original French agencement, which has no direct correlation in English.v Unlike 
the English word ‘assemblage’, which indicates a more-or-less fixed arrangement in which you 
bring the necessary parts together to create a whole (for example, to assemble a bike), an 
agencement is ‘a construction, an arrangement, or a layout’ (Nail, 2017, p. 22) which may change 
and does not have the same part/whole relationship. Agencement therefore indicates an 
arrangement of a multiplicity with associations of mobility that are lost in the English assemblage. 
Ian Buchanan suggests that the plain language meaning of the English ‘assemblage’ has resulted 
in an ‘undue emphasis on the idea of “assembling” as the core process of assemblages’ 
(Buchanan, 2017, p. 458). By this he means that the focus is too often on gathering things together 
(compiling), rather than analysing how things are structured or arranged (composing) (Buchanan, 
2017, p. 458). This is an important point because the analytical power of the assemblage is in 
showing how its diverse components work in combination to produce particular effects. Despite 
these important issues of translation, and notwithstanding Deleuze and Guattari’s inconsistent 
use of the term,vi in keeping with common academic practice I use the translated English term 
‘assemblage’ throughout this article, inviting the reader to retain a sense of the assemblage as a 
composed yet mobile multiplicity.  
 
Assemblage and dispositif 
 
As Deleuze (1999, p. 14, 2007b) acknowledged, the assemblage is closely related to 
Foucault’s concept of the dispositif, often translated into English as ‘apparatus,’ which gained 
importance within his later works.vii However, the assemblage should not be understood as a direct 
descendent of Foucault’s dispositif, because of the reciprocal influence of Deleuze’s work on 
Foucault’s later thought, and their shared intellectual milieu.viii Giorgio Agamben argues that the 
dispositif is ‘a decisive technical term in the strategy of Foucault’s thought,’ essential to his political 
philosophy of power and ‘governmentality’ (Agamben, 2009, p. 2). This locates the dispositif (and 
therefore, I would suggest, the assemblage), as part of a network of political concepts which 
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attempted to comprehend the period’s altered sense of power, subjectivity, state and sovereignty, 
in the wake of contemporary anti-colonial and worker struggles, and to reckon with the future of 
Marxism in the crisis brought about by Stalinism.  
             Both Deleuze (2007b) and Agamben (2009) wrote influential accounts of the dispositif 
where they attempted to pull together a general definition from Foucault’s contextual uses of the 
concept. In his essay Agamben quotes from a 1977 interview in which Foucault describes the 
dispositif as made up of:  
 
a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, architectural 
forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, 
philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions - in short, the said as much as the 
unsaid… The dispositif is the network which is arranged between these elements 
(Agamben, 2009, p. 2; Foucault et al., 1980, pp. 195–196). 
 
             The dispositif shares with the assemblage a conceptualisation as a reasonably mobile 
arrangement of practices, statements, things and the relations between them. In defining the 
dispositif as also the ‘network which is arranged between these elements’ it is clear that the 
configuration of the dispositif and what it includes and excludes is of vital political importance. 
According the Foucault, the dispositif works ‘a perpetual process of strategic elaboration’ (Foucault 
et al., 1980, p. 195 emphasis in original), which nonetheless has unforeseen effects (Foucault et 
al., 1980, p. 195). Foucault uses the historical example of the dispositif of imprisonment having 
the unintended effect of producing ‘delinquency’, a form of social life or subjectivity shaped by 
repeated imprisonment and surveillance (Foucault et al., 1980, pp. 195–196). Consequently, 
prison cannot be understood to be a response to, nor a remedy for, delinquency. In A Thousand 
Plateaus Deleuze and Guattari pick up this example, arguing that following Foucault, we need to 
understand ‘prison’ and ‘delinquency’ as ‘in a state of unstable equilibrium or reciprocal 
presupposition’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 75). The unforeseen effects of the dispositif’s 
elaboration are also very close to the assemblage in its ‘lines of flight’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, 
p. 9) which escape from the assemblage and mutate it.  
             As Foucault specifies, the dispositif is as much the ‘said’ as the ‘unsaid’, and it is in his 
work from this period that he began ‘to examine the empirical interactions between [the] discursive 
and non-discursive’ (Olssen, 2014, p. 37). In Discipline and Punish (Foucault, 1991), he shows 
how ‘punishment’ is produced by an interactive articulation of both material practices such as 
torture and imprisonment and discourses, utterances and laws which are mutually shaping. Much 
can be drawn from Foucault’s thought. However, as befitting his ‘genealogical’ approach, his 
materials were primarily historical textual artefacts drawn from institutional archives. I would argue 
that Deleuze and Guattari’s work offers a richer conceptual vocabulary to comprehend research 
encounters as they are unfolding, and to try and capture the multiplicity of events. Writing on 
Discipline and Punish, Deleuze and Guattari argue that understanding how these different things 
are brought together requires attempting to map or diagram ‘a whole organization articulating 
formations of power and regimes of signs… operating on a molecular level’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 
2004a, p. 75). In other words, it requires us to map out the assemblage.  
             A Thousand Plateaus attempts just such a mapping; indeed Deleuze described the 
assemblage as the ‘general logic’ of the book (Deleuze, 2007a, p. 177).ix As with the dispositif, the 
assemblage is not introduced as a formal analytic model but rather is presented through a series 
of examples such as the ‘rhizome’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 3–28). A rhizome is a plant 
with an acentered root system, for example ginger. These can grow in any direction and if cut off 
or blocked in one path, they will sprout forth elsewhere like the mythical Hydra’s heads. Deleuze 
and Guattari invoke the rhizome for the differing model it provides from the biological image they 
claim dominates Western thought: the tree. Trees are organised hierarchically, with branches 
growing out from a central trunk, and all the root network and spread of leaves working to nourish 
and maintain a central stem. They argue that dominant western philosophy has modelled itself 
upon this ‘arborescent schema’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 323), to produce a rigid hierarchy 
of concepts with largely unquestioned transcendental truth claims at the top, organizing the 
production of thought all the way down and rendering some thoughts inconceivable. Considering 
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this critique, re-producing concepts as assemblages could be seen as a politicised thought 
experiment. If we conceptualised crime as an assemblage, what thoughts become possible? 
 
 
Crime as an assemblage 
In conceptualising crime as an assemblage or multiplicity the first thing to note is that crime is both 
a designation for an event, and a category of acts and practices which are diverse and historically 
and geographically contingent, sharing an essential commonality only in their illegality. The social 
and political effects of false equivalences between qualitatively different kinds of crime are well 
known. For example, the effect of treating a racialised, street-based crime like ‘mugging’ as a 
metonym for crime per se, has the effect of imputing features such as acquisitiveness or 
confrontation to all crime, but also of making crimes which happen in other spaces such as 
domestic or cyber spaces less visible as crimes. I suggest that the assemblage can help us both 
to attend to differences within the category of crime, and to analyse singular crime events as 
multiplicities. It encourages us to decentre individual accounts and experiences, whether those of 
the criminal, the victim, or researcher from our analysis of crime. It urges us to pay attention to the 
workings of non-human actors. The assemblage allows us to treat each crime as plural and 
irreducible. This doesn’t mean that we cannot engage with questions of agency, intentionality or 
responsibility, but it means that we do not have a blueprint for doing this work.  
             In thinking through crime as an active or purposive assemblage we might notice the way 
that certain versions of the concept dominate, appearing tenacious, or stratified. There are 
recurring features within different versions of the crime assemblage. As an in-exhaustive list of 
materials that might be included in an assemblage of crime, I offer:  
             The acts and statements of state agencies such as the various courts, prisons, police 
forces, parliaments, the Home Office, political parties, semi-autonomous think tanks, grassroots 
political organisations, religions and social movements, universities, schools and other sites of 
learning. The acts and statements of academics who assemble versions of crime through their 
work, and of those persons produced as ‘criminals’, and of those who break laws through their 
actions but are not criminalised. The affective and emotional states of these human and non-
human bodies. The algorithmically-determined search results returned upon querying ‘crime’ on 
an internet search engine. Present and past conceptualisations and practices of morality, law, 
virtue, human nature, property, need, violence, justice, society, community, danger, harm, gender, 
revenge, race, class. Concepts and feelings that cause some people to decide to cross the street 
to avoid other people. Doors locked or unlocked at night. The statements made in prior 
criminological texts and by contemporary practitioners, all of which interact with ideas and affects 
outside the discipline. The statements which enact the laws that define the criminal in a specific 
time and place, simultaneously defining the ‘victim’ of crime. The domestic extremism watch list. 
Technologies, like DNA testing, the survey, handcuffs, CCTV, or the interview and the different kinds 
of data they produce. Forms of representation – graphs, maps, photographs and diagrams and 
text and novels and films and TV judges. Characters enunciated – plural images like crime as a 
‘disease’ or an ‘epidemic’ of a certain type of crime.  Images of crime as rarity like the ‘serial killer’ 
or the ‘career criminal’. Stock phrases with built in social explanations such as ‘crimes of passion’, 
‘honour killings’, ‘mercy killings’, ‘angels of mercy’, ‘black widows’, ‘dirty cops’, ‘knife crime’, 
‘broken windows’, crime as the glue of our social fabric, a crime of opportunity, crime as inevitable 
or banal, the ‘ex-con’, the retired gangster living in the Costa del Sol…  
             This list should not be imagined as comprising unchanging, discrete elements, but rather 
as composed of materials that themselves are also multiple, complex, transforming and 
interactive. Some of the institutions and agencies included above are themselves social 
assemblages (for example, prisons, courts, and religions) which produce their own shifting territory. 
For example, Elaine Campbell (2016) discusses how the digital vigilantism of ‘paedophile hunters’ 
is mutating the concept of policing. The reader may have noticed how geographically and 
temporally located my list is – even this initial list hints at a territory and casts a shadow portrait 
of the list-maker, who is part of the assemblage rather than outside of it. As I have already noted, 
assemblages comprise both ‘content’ and ‘expressions’ which are mutually presupposed and co-
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constituted (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 200–201). Crucially, the above list is not an 
assemblage of crime, it is merely a speculative list of materials. Each assemblage takes:  
 
a particular form: it selects, draws together, stakes out, and envelops a territory. It is made 
up of imaginative, contingent articulations among myriad heterogeneous elements… these 
bodies only appear to be in proximity with one another given a particular act of imaginative 
gathering (Slack & Wise, 2014, p. 156).  
 
             Despite this mutability, assemblages also have (at least some) appearance of coherence 
and boundedness. Thus, although connectivity is an important principle of the assemblage 
(Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 7), it is not the case that everything is therefore connected together. 
The way these assemblages are figured intersects with organising flows of power, making 
inclusions and exclusions, determining what can be said and done. The territory produced through 
an assemblage of crime might work to hide other possible ways of assembling crime which would 
necessarily have different effects. Thus, the content and form of the constellation of crime matters, 
affecting our lives, our representations and practices. 
             The mobility of the assemblage can help us think about the contingency of crime; a 
particular shift in the arrangement of elements included in an assemblage might mutate it into 
something else, for example an accident rather than a crime. Different versions of crime are 
assembled from different elements, and stake out territories of differing scales, based on the 
extensity of their networks of elements, and the stratification of certain elements through their 
repeated inclusion – for example, the police as actors. This repetition might appear to give the 
assemblage an essence or attribute of enduring power. However, it’s important to note that 
Deleuze and Guattari follow Foucault (1990, pp. 92–101) in maintaining that features of 
assemblages such as power, agency and organisation are effects of the articulations or elements, 
rather than properties of things or persons. 
 
Coherence and change 
Any account of a social phenomenon must account for change, and deal with scale. So how and 
where does change occur within the assemblage model? As we have seen, despite occupying 
various states of stratification, assemblages are not static, timeless, or inevitable. They are 
relatively open systems animated by the dynamics of social processes. Deleuze and Guattari 
write: ‘the assemblage has both territorial sides, or reterritorialized sides, which stabilize it, and 
cutting edges of deterritorialization, which carry it away’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 98). 
Although the assemblage reproduces itself to stabilise and establish a territory, every brush 
against the outside of the assemblage entails deterritorialisations, otherwise known as ‘lines of 
flight’ which transform it. As William Bogard writes, ‘in a crucial sense, assemblages as a whole 
are lines of flight’ in their mobility (Bogard, 2006, p. 108). Bogard (2006, p. 108) draws attention 
to the way in which assemblages pursuing a line of flight, for example the shift from the 
spectacle of public torture to the isolation of prison, nonetheless retain deterritorialised traces of 
the former configuration within the new assemblage of punishment. Public adulation of the 
clandestine ‘master criminal’ is an example of a ‘line of flight’ in the crime assemblage. As 
Foucault noted (1980, p. 46), the popularity of physiognomic theories of deviance in the late 19th 
century had the unforeseen effect of creating the character of the unmarked ‘master criminal’ 
who is able to pass unknown among polite society. Perhaps the best example of this character is 
Marcel Allain and Pierre Souvestre’s anti-hero Fantômas, who perpetually outmanoeuvred the 
police detectives committed to his capture and thrillingly denied a fascinated public the visual 
pleasure of looking into his eyes and knowing him. This is not an arc of pure freedom or escape 
route, as lines of flight get tied up again (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 250), and we should 
consider the deterritorialising faceless, fictional Fantômas in conjunction with the 
reterritorialising relentless public appetite for mugshots and other images of ‘real’ criminal 
bodies.  
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Furthering their account of how change happens, Deleuze and Guattari contend that 
assemblages operate between two immanent and intersecting processes: the ‘molar’, and the 
‘molecular’ (see especially Deleuze and Guattari, 2004a: 229–255). It is important to note that 
their theory doesn’t map onto common sociological ideas of the more easily separated (large-scale) 
macro and (small-scale) micro social phenomena in which each could be claimed to condition the 
other. The difference between these processes is qualitative, not quantitative (Marks, 1998, p. 
100). Thus we cannot ‘scale up’ from molecular flows to grasp molar segmentations. Instead, the 
processes are enmeshed; both ‘haunted’ in their ‘operation and organization’ (Ansell-Pearson, 
2012, p. 182) by the other. This invites us to attend to the interaction of subtler affective, molecular 
flows with molar processes. Particularly within complex criminal justice processes like sentencing, 
risk assessment, and release on license. Emerging from thresholds of molecular flows of force, the 
molar process is formed of clearly defined and rigid segments. This is the level of individual entities, 
whose formation is dependent on the actions of machines which through a process of ‘exclusive 
disjunctions’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, pp. 83–90) – ‘this, not that’ – cut out, or mark, binary 
subjectivations, races, sectors, professions, crimes, classes, genders etc. from the flux of force and 
energy. They also refer to this process as ‘coding… a socius of inscription where the essential thing 
is to mark and be marked’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 156). Historically, much thinking about 
crime has followed the machinations of molar selection to constitute crime from the populations 
already codified as criminal, for example the working class, the male, the young, the unemployed, 
and ethnic minorities. To do this almost inevitably means working from a sample to produce a 
general theory of crime that both pre-criminalises those who fit the code (scaling down) and treats 
qualitatively different crimes as if they were the same (scaling up). The second, ‘molecular’ process 
consists of ‘fluxes’ of pre-personal affects and perceptions (Deleuze & Parnet, 1987, p. 124). 
Deleuze and Guattari warn that molecular processes should not be misconceived as being more 
‘intimate’, ‘imaginary’, of a more ‘personal’ nature, or ‘freer’, as molecular processes are constantly 
being brought back under the order of molar representation in a mode which is complex and subtle 
in creating new codes (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 237). Attentive to the ‘micropolitics’ of an 
event, Deleuze and Guattari note the potential for erroneously ‘believing that a little suppleness is 
enough to make things "better"… microfascisms are what make fascism so dangerous, and fine 
segmentations are as harmful as the most rigid of segments’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 237).  
             As Deleuze and Guattari make plain, exclusive disjunctions or segmentation also operates 
on the molecular level, for example through the machine of ‘faciality’:  
 
The face is not an envelope exterior to the person who speaks, thinks, or feels… A child, 
woman, mother, man, father, boss, teacher, police officer, does not speak a general 
language but one whose signifying traits are indexed to specific faciality traits. Faces are 
not basically individual; they define zones of frequency or probability, delimit a field that 
neutralizes in advance any expressions or connections unamenable to the appropriate 
significations (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 186). 
 
            The workings of faciality are not random, and Deleuze and Guattari are keen to diagnose 
‘the relation of the face to the assemblages of power that require that social production’ (2004a, 
p. 201). So, if not all assemblages require facialisation (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 194), when 
does this occur? They suggest instances such as ‘the maternal power operating through the face 
during nursing… the political power operating through the face of the leader … the power of film 
operating through the face of the star and the close-up’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, p. 194). The 
criminal justice system has always required facialisation. One could add examples like the face of 
the ringleader who led the ‘headless’ mob; the face designated as that of a properly political 
prisoner; or the serial killer who looked like a heartthrob. As Kelly Gates argues: ‘a cultural analysis 
of automated facial recognition and expression analysis technologies provides evidence that the 
drive to “know the face” continues to be stimulated by new photographic technologies, while at the 
same time pushing the development of these technologies in particular directions’ (Gates, 2011, 
p. 8). These new developments in surveillance and image analysis correspondingly drive new 
technologies of masking, evasion and image scrambling (Hern, 2017). Faciality reminds us that 
subtle interpersonal acts of looking and being looked at form part of the machinery of social 
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codification and inscription. For example, we might think about the subtle reading of working class 
bodies as ‘respectable’ (Skeggs, 1997) or not; or the affective reading of a racialised urban area 
as ‘sketchy’ or dangerous; or the feeling that someone is giving a truthful account; or the 
legitimation of an act of violence based on the agent’s fear or sense of foreboding. 
 
 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have discussed the assemblage as it appears in the work of Deleuze and Guattari. 
I have argued that the assemblage is most useful as a tool of critical analysis, rather than for the 
description of a complex system or network. The assemblage can help us to think about the 
micropolitics of crime, social control and punishment. It helps us ask how was this crime produced 
as such, and what effects does this have. Deleuze describes the assemblage as part of a ‘theory-
practice of multiplicities’ (Deleuze, 1999, p. 14). So, to conclude I will sketch some of the ways 
that adopting this conceptual framing might affect the way we practice and research crime and 
punishment. 
In conceptualising subjects as assemblages or multiplicities, we cannot simply invoke criminals, 
victims, witnesses, or researchers as discrete individuals, let alone as sharing essential qualities 
with all others we might seek to categorise with them. With a mobile, non-essential model of things 
and people in mind, we cannot accept that criminalised people are simply or intrinsically criminal. 
Instead, we recognise that people are in process, and are produced from their material and 
affective relations with the rest of the world. A non-essential and non-unitary conception of the 
subject as an assemblage has strong implications for the researcher as one who is constantly 
being constituted as a researcher through the research process, rather than a pre-formed subject 
who then commences their research. Inspired by Deleuze and Guattari’s conceptualisation of 
‘becoming’ (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004a, pp. 256–341), the anthropologist Alphonso Lingis invokes 
a sense of research as practicing a social bond, one that is not premised on a ‘social contract’, or 
a relationship of extraction or exchange, but rather on ‘couplings’ (Lingis, 1994, p. 293).x This is 
not a coupling at the level of discrete individuals, but an affective becoming-with in a symbiotic 
relationship. Whilst mutually affecting, these couplings are not necessarily benign, and can also 
be violent or unequal. Becoming-with is not mimesis: it is not to suggest, for example, that 
researching with police is to become identifiably like police, but rather that in the encounter we 
both affect each other and become different. Becoming is not turning from one thing into another; 
it is not an in-between state moving from one identity to another. Instead it refers to a ceaseless 
process of transformation. We and everything else are always becoming-different, even when it 
appears as if nothing is changing.xi This has methodological implications for how we treat the 
materials of research which have a propensity to become ‘fixed’ and treated as evidence, such as 
interview transcripts. A desire to do research which better captures the process of ‘becoming’ 
together might also lead to the use of more durational or collaborative forms of research and 
representation. It also encourages us to be more modest in our claims for the impact of our 
research. 
            Jasbir Puar argues that adopting the open model of the assemblage allows us ‘to attune to 
movements, intensities, emotions, energies, affectivities, and textures as they inhabit events, 
spatiality, and corporealities’ (Puar, 2007, p. 215). It also encourages us to move beyond legal 
definitions and temporal boundaries when considering the event. Assemblages produce a 
multitude of effects that are not direct or linear, but diffuse. As a result, one cannot engage Deleuze 
and Guattari’s work to produce a theory of strong crime causality. Thinking about the ‘cutting 
edges’ of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation reminds us that criminalisation and 
punishment are not a necessary outcome of committing a crime, but an effect of molecular and 
molar processes that codify some of us, and not others, as criminal or punishable. This draws our 
attention to the politics of the crime assemblage, and also to the differing temporalities of crime 
as an event, and criminalisation as an effect of longer process involving repeated social 
codification. This has implications for social policy: for instance, what is the appropriate time and 
space for punishment if we are not singular and authentic subjects but multiple selves shaped by 
our ongoing social interactions with others? Thinking with the assemblage also enables us to 
decentre the individual, be it the criminal or the victim, from our analysis of crime. It allows one to 
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pay attention to the workings of other human and non-human actors in the assemblage of crime, 
and it forces us to pay attention to the labour of the researcher. The assemblage of crime is not 
static: it is always being deterritorialised and reterritorialised, even if it appears relatively stable. 
Actualisations of the assemblage don’t exhaust its potential to be otherwise, and to produce a 
different actuality in the future. The concept sensitises us to repetitions and stratification within 
the assemblage of crime but enables us to effect some change in our pursuit of lines of flight.  
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i A Thousand Plateaus is the second part of two-volume text Capitalism and Schizophrenia, the 
first part being Anti-Oedipus (1972, first translated into English in 1977). 
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ii At the request of an anonymous reviewer, the following is a note on my use of language and 
aspirations for this piece. Like many scholars inspired by the work of Deleuze and Guattari I admire 
their dazzling linguistic style. However, when scholars emulate this style the result is sometimes a 
kind of conceptual ‘word salad’ which is impenetrable and alienating for the unattuned reader. I 
find this most unhelpful in scholarship which brings these philosophical concepts into new 
disciplinary spaces, where readers are more likely to be encountering these ideas for the first time. 
As such, here I aim to write in a way that might encourage wider engagement with the philosophical 
concepts which have so greatly enriched my own work. 
iii The assemblage is a redefinition and development of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘desiring 
machines’ in Anti-Oedipus, where, according to a set of relational rules, machines are coupled with 
each other in a ‘productive synthesis’. See (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004b, p. 5) They also previously 
discussed the assemblage in relation to the fiction of Franz Kafka (Deleuze & Guattari, 2012). 
iv The concept was developed during the heyday of systems theory and as such these machines 
are conceptualised as inherently leaks and producing unexpected excesses rather than closed 
systems with perfect functionality. 
v This translation is attributed to Paul Foss and Paul Patton see: (Deleuze & Guattari, 1981) Ian 
Buchanan (Buchanan, 2015, p. 383) suggests ‘arrangement’ as a preferable translation.  
vi By ‘inconsistent’ I mean that sometimes they don’t use the term itself but it is clear that they are 
using the model of the assemblage.  
vii It is present in works written in the mid-1970s for example in Discipline and Punish, The History 
of Sexuality Volume 1vii and his Collège de France lectures from 1975/6 onwards. 
viii In the creation of their concepts Deleuze and Guattari drew inspiration from literary theory, 
structuralist linguistics, novels, visual art, music, cybernetics, complexity and systems theories and 
Guattari’s clinical observations as well as anthropology, political theory, psychoanalysis and 
philosophy.  
ix In this interview, from the year of the publication of A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze suggests that 
the work of analysing assemblages to find their ‘general logic’ had only just begun.  
x For an alternative discussion of ‘becoming-together’ see (Fraser, 2009) 
xi As Deleuze argues in Logic of Sense ‘This is the simultaneity of a becoming whose characteristic 
is to elude the present. Insofar as it eludes the present, becoming does not tolerate the separation 
or the distinction of before and after, or of past and future. It pertains to the essence of becoming 
to move and to pull in both directions at once’ (Deleuze, 2004b, p. 3). 
